Dietz & Butler, Kelsey

In her piece "Context Is All: Feminism And Theories of Citizenship" Mary Dietz explores the ways in which liberalism and liberal feminism as a result have not been sufficient to address the true nature of patriarchal structures and female oppression. She argues that the Wester liberal ideals that permeate our political systems were constructed based on notions about individuality, productivity, and value that are not only gendered towards benefiting men in a patriarchal society but also contribute to the inadequacy of certain feminist political aims, aims that seek redress for gendered wrongs through and in the very system that constructed these wrongs in the first place. She explores how Marxist feminists have been successful in critiquing the capitalist elements of patriarchy but have left little to be determined about his idea of "citizenship" and its social implications. She also depicts maternalist feminists who view the liberal notion of individuality as false, because it assumes a sort of male autonomy that has not been afforded to women historically. Dietz agrees that "context is all" but sees feminism as a solution that can change and reconstruct the systems that make up "context".

In the first chapter of "Undoing Gender", Judith Butler explores how people are "undone" by each other and how relationally is extremely important to our socials and political structures. She discusses how normalization affects the ways we relate to each other not only of personal interactional levels, but in larger social contexts and how these modes of normalization create ways of relating that can sometimes be exclusive and violent. On p. 37 she argues that a "critical democratic project" is needed to combat gender and sex inequality. This project for her is to simultaneously claim entitlement to the "access" that Dietz talks about in liberal terms, and to also critique and reanalyze these systems that we are attempting to "access" at the same time.

Deitz & Butler

The writing by Dietz is centered around the idea of citizenship. She argues that women should take a more participatory and democratic role to politics. The reason why she argues this is because concepts such as maternalism and liberalism are simply not enough. Maternalism takes the private life of women and transfers it into the public realm where women are viewed as an individual that are available to care and nurture everyone. Whereas, liberalism places a lot of emphasis on the role of women as individuals seeking equality. However, neither of these concepts seems to bring together citizens to take action. On the other hand, democracy unifies individuals and gives them a political identity rather than the individual simply being seen as a “mother”, for example. Moreover, Dietz warns people that to be a womanist opposes the notion of taking a democratic position in politics. To claim that women are superior to men opposes the democratic ideal that no ones voice is more important than another persons.

            Similarly, Judith Butler states that the notion of autonomy that liberalism often perpetuates is foolish. She uses tragedy and how vulnerable we are to demonstrate that we are dependent on each other. At any time, we can by harmed by a complete stranger, which indicates that there is a need for politics that relates to our interactions within our communities. Butler goes onto describe the violence that occurs to transgender women. She expresses that the people that commit these acts of violence have had social norms and rigid categories of gender drilled into their minds. In order to reduce this violence then we would have to deconstruct the notions of gender and what it means to be human in order to make the world a more livable place. Furthermore, she speaks of the fact that we should be a part of the democratic project. What it means to be a woman has been decided in a way in which it excludes many women. This means that it is up to us to transform this construct, so that all women can be valued and so that transgendered women’s rights are valued in the same way as the rights of other women.

            In summary, I think that both Deitz and Butler are calling for women to deconstruct these notions of what society has said women should be like, so that we can actively reconstruct the idea of what it means to be a woman. Both readings are similar, as they both seem to advocate for feminist politics that allows women to be active rather than passive. 

Dietz and Butler

In this week’s reading, Dietz discusses the political theory of liberalism and how it relates to citizenship. She discusses how in many feminist dialogues, sociocultural inequality is addressed but the issues of women pertaining particularly to the political arena are barren. She then goes on to explicate the two prevailing feminist voices in the issue: those of the Marxist feminists and those of the maternal feminists.

 According to her, Marxist feminists believe that “a system of economics and gender rooted in capitalist, male-dominant structures underlies much of the liberal ideology, from the notion of the independent rational man to the conception of separate private and public realms, from the value of individualism to the equation of freedom with free trade,” and then goes on to say that while this view challenges the patriarchal nature of capitalism and other current forms of free trade and labor, it does little to talk about the issues surrounding citizenship specifically (Dietz 8). Dietz counteracts this by suggesting that maternal feminists do more to discuss the issues of citizenship, however their idea of citizenship in terms of women’s right and liberties is often domestic in nature and revolves around the free expression of qualities dubbed feminine (and thus more morally upright); such as love and caring for others. Dietz argues that “citizenship must be conceived of as a continuous activity and a good in itself” and not a as a means to an end like many political parties represent it as. In doing so, keeping democratic citizenship as a dynamic dialogue permits the voices of many women from different ethnic and class backgrounds to contribute and partake in. 

Judith Butler similarly shares her take on the idea of autonomy, and how as rational, living, beings, we often cannot escape the doings or undoings of those around us. Like Dietz, she discusses the importance of a collective and the danger of abandoning that collective in the name of some obscure autonomous state where we think we exist outside of the influence of others.

Deitz and Butler

Briefly describe the kind of politics that each of the authors (Dietz, writing in 1987, and Butler, writing in 2004) calls for.  In what ways, if at all, are they advocating for a “feminist politics” — or calling for a new kind of feminist politics?

The readings do not necessarily call for a new kind of feminist politics. In particular, the ways that Dietz describes the tenets of liberalism and the "liberal political vision" are in many ways similar to the ways in which feminist politics has been practice in the past (e.g. the personal is the political). Dietz says that "we understand human beings as rational individuals who have intrinsic worth" and "The concept of rights is of fundamental importance to the liberal political vision" (Dietz 2, 4). The conclusion I draw from this is that the way feminism manifests itself in practice aligns with notions of citizenship in our political system. But this is precisely why we may perhaps need to re-conceive feminist politics in order to move away from the "mainstream view of women's work and its reliance on the law, the state, interest groups, and state-instituted reforms as the source of social justice, individual equality, and 'access'" (Dietz 8).

But Dietz does identify where this tension lies: "when power is perceived in terms of access to social, economic, or political institutions, other possibilities (including the radical one that power has nothing to do with access to institutions at all) are left out" (Dietz 7). This idea runs parallel to some of the ideas in Butler's piece, Butler's approach to feminist politics is much more epistemological. It lies in understanding and attempting to reframe our conception of gender and even our conceptions of personhood as "bounded beings, distinct, recognizable, delineated, subjects before the law, a community defined by sameness" (Butler 20). Butler acknowledges the "normative aspiration of any movement that seeks to maximize the protection and the freedoms of sexual and gender minorities" can be difficult to reconcile with the paradox of "bodily autonomy" (Butler 21). Butler starkly differs from Dietz in that she critiques the process of individuation itself, which is an entirely different and pre-existing question than a critique of the state.

Butler seems to espouse a re-conception of autonomy and societal oppression that is somewhat Foucauldian. She says that "perhaps the interrelated movements and modes of inquiry that collect here might need to consider autonomy as one dimension of their normative aspirations...the way in which the body figures in gender and sexuality studies, and in the struggles for a less oppressive social world for otherwise gendered and for sexual minorities of all kinds, is precisely to underscore the value of being beside oneself, of being a porous boundary,,,in a field of others in which one is not the presumptive center" (25). These words are reminiscent of a Foulcauldian conception of power, in which power is internal to everyone, and power lies not with oppressive institutions but through a network of discourse that injects power into everyone, through everything, cannot be separated from personhood and its harness-er cannot be identified as an individual or group.

I think both Dietz and Butler call for a new kind of feminist politics that departs from classical liberalism and notions of state-sponsored egalitarian pursuits. However, I think Butler's critique of our conception of our bodies is more radical and a more difficult reframing of feminist politics.

Dietz and Butler

Dietz piece focuses exclusively on the implications of citizenship rights. National laws regarding earning citizenship range from not being able to gain citizenship or gaining  citizenship after living within the country for a set amount of time. However, even with the benefits of  gaining citizenship or being born with citizenship, the guarantee of accessibility to the benefits of citizenship does not exist for all. Dietz states, “a second tenet of liberal political thought is that society should ensure the freedom of all its members to realize their capabilities”.  In essence, accessibility  is fundamental to reaching these personal capabilities.

It is evident that, although minorities are born within US borders they are still not afforded the same rights at their white counterparts. Even more even though women are born in the US or have gained citizenship , they still not provided with the same resources as that of men. Feminist politics raises awareness of the disadvantages of being a citizen but not being treated as a citizen. Or the implications of being “equal” but still being different levels of equal.

Deitz and Butler and avoiding "definitions"

These readings really helped me with last weeks' and the notion of personal/ political autonomy.  Deitz analysis of feminism in terms of Marxism and the "economic, not political freedom" that we should be aiming for smoothed things out for me in terms of what the goal of political autonomy entails.  She differs from Zerilli and Cornell, I gather, because Deitz focuses on the end goal of economic freedom rather than delineating the specifics of the flaws of liberalism and democracy as Zerilli does and the psychology behind autonomy as Cornell address. In this way, the readings all complement each other and shed light on confusing aspects present in each paper.
Deitz fundamentally addresses the term "citizenship" and brings to light it's limitations through maternalist and Marxist feminist views.  The two types of feminism contradict each other in that the former chooses to focus on a woman's individual definition of her self and fulfillment through that woman's desires whereas the latter looks at women as too much of a unit, marxism views individuals not as people but as mobilization of labor and therefore obstructs the essence of what it means to be "woman." Dietz critiques both of these views as limiting towards the female's involvement in her political world.  She argues that women must direct efforts towards an active participation in one's political realm rather than argue over the semantics of "feminism."  She seeks to avoid defining broad terms and rather focus on the betterment of one's community.  Feminism will necessarily follow.
Judith Butler seems to be positing a similar approach in a different way.  Looking from the standpoint of sexuality, she too urges that creating definitive political views are dangerous for the active and capricious autonomous lives of human beings.  By allowing a standard such as marriage to dictate the acceptance of certain groups, one inevitably falls into traps of rejection over time.  Human personality cannot be defined.  Psychologists have struggled with such a task for decades; therefore neither can feminism, nor womanism, nor bisexuality etc....
Instead of focusing on what the correct political diction evolves into, Dietz and Butler both posit (in their own ways) a movement away from actual definitions, because such will be inherently exclusive. Rather, one must become a part of the political processes that adjusts the flawed intricacies of today in order to better tomorrow for the next generation.

Cornell & Zerilli, Kelsey

Both Cornell and Zerilli discuss the relationship between feminism and freedom or autonomy. In both of their discussions they acknowledge the need for an autonomous subject to experience the states of freedom or autonomy. Where they differ is in what constitutes the existence of freedom. Is it the ability to perform or claim actions? Or is it the existence of an autonomous state of being at all?

In her piece, Cornell discusses autonomy from a philosophical standpoint focusing on the relationship between desire, dignity, and autonomy. She explains that autonomy and dignity, in classical philosophical and moral contexts, are connected and that having the autonomy to express desire and to make decisions is a reflection of being dignified. Cornell references what we've been referring to as "choice feminism" when she says, "There is no bright line between good desires and bad desire because the whole point here is to emphasize the importance of women claiming their desiring subjectivity. This means that it's not so much about the moral status of the desires themselves, but that autonomy and dignity is tied up in the action of claiming to have and be able to desire at all. In this way, it is a woman's choice not to identify as a feminist and so a woman practicing "choice feminism" should honor that desire.

Zerilli points out that theorizing about freedom within feminism is inherently tied to the study of politics and democracy more generally. Liberal feminist viewpoints and discussions about freedom and autonomy are linked to the existence of a liberal subject with the ability to navigate society freely in the first place. She points out how for feminists to seek this freedom is somewhat paradoxical because women have usually not been included in the category of liberal subjects. She also notes how politics has a goal and to make political claims is always to work towards an end, but what is that end for feminists seeking democratic freedom?

Zerilli & Cornell

The readings by Cornell and Zerilli explore conflicts within feminism. Zerilli’s piece explores the conflict between openness and closure feminism. Openness in feminism being this over-arching type of feminism that attempts to unify all women. The reading critiques this approach as it can lead to particular groups of women speaking for other groups of women. Whereas, closure in feminism is the idea that there are sub-groups within feminism, which allows particular groups of women to speak for themselves. However, the closure approach has its own conflicts because it infers that feminists cannot come together and form a type of feminism that is inclusive of all women. Whereas, Cornell seems to be stressing the importance of the individual on feminism as a whole. Cornell states, “unless someone is able to claim her desire as her own, she does not even know what she is reasoning about” (147). The conflict here seems to be on the individual level. We are often in conflict with our desires and ourselves as we are living in the “imaginary domain”. In this imaginary place, we basically form ourselves in relation to others rather than what we truly desire. Furthermore, this a severe conflict as Cornell states that it is form through “ego-ideals”, which carry unconscious material that we can never fully grasp or come to terms with.

Moreover, I think the two entries are similar because they both in some way explore the idea that feminism cannot be static. Cornell’s piece does this by stating that the “images and norms as we externalize them and act out our lives as men and women” (145). This means that through our continuous actions we have the power to deconstruct gender norms. Whereas Zerilli’s piece infers that feminism cannot be static through  the idea that people should have the freedom to debunk, question and alter things within a democracy and within feminism.

Cornell and Zerilli

This week’s prompt is: Drucilla Cornell’s and Linda Zerlli’s works are very compatible and complementary.  Identify and discuss at least two ways in which the themes and discussions of the two readings intersect, e.g. Zerilli on freedom and Cornell on autonomy. Also, are there any significant differences in their approaches?

Both Zerilli and Cornell draw the unavoidable duality of “theory” and “lived experiences” that exists in feminist discourse. For Cornell, this means a distinction between the unconscious and conscious, highlighting that it “we cannot make the separation…because of the structural moment of the imaginary” (Cornell 146). Essentially Cornell points out that we can only know ourselves through the “already imagined,” meaning that we cannot fully recapture an identity outside of pre-existing contexts and via a cultural, ethnic, and societal vacuum. This translates to our idea of agency, and according to Cornell, we make decisions only inasmuch as our environment shapes and defines what would be appropriate in certain situations.

In spite of all this, much like Zerilli, Cornell claims that autonomy is not lost because it cannot exist free of the conditions of the “other,” but rather it remains as still needing to be claimed via the “elaboration of this discourse” (Cornell 147). Zerilli similarly makes claims about feminism by paralleling it to democracy, stating “there is a constitutive and ineradicable tension between openness and closure in feminism…this tension is related to the free act that calls into existence “women” as a political collectivity, just as the free act of political founding described by Arendt calls into existence “the people”” (Zerilli 168). According to her, feminism is confounded in that it must hold its autonomous and independent identity of belonging to “the women” while also accepting non-infallibility and openness to opposing and potentially constructive claims. This flux exists in democratic discourse as well and is related to Cornell’s duality of the unconscious and autonomous mind.

Cornell and Zerilli

Both Cornell and Zerilli are primarily concerned with the negotiation of feminism in the context of politics. More specifically, they strive to ascertain how feminism reconciles subjective desires and autonomy with collectivism in democratic institutions.

Cornell's conception of political subjectivity is loosely based in Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative. That is, if we are to assume that rational actors want autonomy because they desire individual ends, and therefore want to advance these ends, we must assume that rational actors would also want autonomy for other rational actors. For Cornell, autonomy is the starting point by which we understand how individual desires accrue to become collective desires and form feminism.

Finally, Cornell concludes that "There is no bright line between good desires and bad desires because the whole point here is to emphasize the importance of women claiming their desiring subjectivity." This means that wanting every woman follow her subjective desires, i.e. be autonomous, leads to a feminism that avoids universal claims and is open to the renegotiation of its founding principles.

Likewise, Zerilli's argument focuses on the notion that "feminism's fundamental principles are provisional and always open to contestation." Zerilli and Cornell agree that feminism manifests itself in the political sphere through the exchange of political claims, where "all social and political relations are in principle open to challenge" (Zerilli 166). Where they diverge, however, is on the derivation of this right to subjective political claims. While Cornell derives her theory from a reason-based approach (Kant), where the capacity to reason is a natural absolute, Zerilli argues that it is "public space" rather than "God, the king, or any other absolute source of authority" that governs democratic principles.

Finally, Cornell and Zerilli disagree on whether they believe feminism has succeeded in managing political spaces. Cornell seems a bit more optimistic that feminism has attained a level of discourse that allows women to express their subjective desires and ends mutually and are given equal consideration. Zerilli, however, is wary that certain a particular conception of feminism could "[assert] itself as hegemonic." Zerilli also claims that "feminists have not adequately articulated the difference between speaking about women as a demographic or social group and speaking about women as a political collectivity." I believe this last point is a legitimate critique that can be waged against feminism. In certain times and places, when feminists attempts to shift conversations about demographic and social issues into the political sphere (i.e. the personal is the political), this is precisely when a certain conception of feminism becomes hegemonic. Even third-wave feminists need to be wary of this.

Zerilli & Cornell

Sunday February 15, 2015

Brittain

The initial intersected theme I noticed between the two pieces was the notion of subconsciously developed self-concept.  Both writers develop the sense of female self-concept, however they do so by different trajectories.  Cornell focuses on one’s self-identity through the ego and psychoanalysis.  She urges that the subconscious developing the female identity based on how we see ourselves in relation/ reflection of others. Women are constantly comparing themselves to both other women as well as the societal “ideal” that is fundamentally androcentric and therefore largely derogatory towards women. Zerilli identifies female self-concept through political language arguing for a subconscious development of self through political organization.  The three Feminist Waves are political organization of a large group in order to represent the interests of the majority and such is the basis for how many women personally view their femininity.  Zerilli and Cornell each describe the domineering issues that subsequently generate from such productions of self-concept.

Both women discuss the particular issues with feminism where women either inadvertently or consciously bring other women down. For Zerilli, race domination displays the issue with democracy and organizing one’s identity politically; considering “feminism” through a political and social “movement” inevitably allows the voices of the majority to be heard at the expense of minority interest parties.  Cornell urges that the constant comparison of self to others inevitably creates an environment of social competition and because society is androcentric, women base their self-identity on an external concept of what it means to be “woman.”  Both writers also address the necessity for Feminism as a movement to redefine itself away from political or social organization; such broad inclusiveness cannot possibly capture the “meaning” of woman.  Therefore, Feminism should be a place of freedom for women, not dogmatic definitions and flawed bases for the feminine self-concept.

Cornell & Zerlli

In the two readings both Cornell and Zerlli examine the complexities that come with defining the concept of freedom with regards to feminism. Cornell argues that feminism is the ego ideal free from outside interference and inequality. She explains, “To understand feminism is to defend its spirit of generosity because each woman or man will internalize it as an ideal in her or his own way” . Cornell states that as creatures of reason we are free to determine our own desires, we are given the autonomy to pursue our desires by the laws of morality, or as Cornell states Dignity. Dignity is the moral law that demands we individuality from the collective to carve our own journey out in life.  The concept of feminism with regards to freedom is has no strict structure and is totally dependent and formed by what the individual sees as an end to his/her desires. Likewise Zerlli discuses freedom in feminism, but offers insight into this freedom in the structure of democratic politics. Zerlli states, “Losing sight of openness, feminism gets entangled in the impossible fantasy that women could constitute a unified political group, without exclusion or remainder”. In essence, a hegemonic form of feminism would ultimately ostracize many. Zerlli reinforces Cornell’s argument that each woman or man will internalize feminism in his or her own way. The very concept of democracy and feminism intersecting leaves open the possibility that one will act to fulfill their own desires irrespective of the collective group.