Briefly describe the kind of politics that each of the authors (Dietz, writing in 1987, and Butler, writing in 2004) calls for. In what ways, if at all, are they advocating for a “feminist politics” — or calling for a new kind of feminist politics?
The readings do not necessarily call for a new kind of feminist politics. In particular, the ways that Dietz describes the tenets of liberalism and the "liberal political vision" are in many ways similar to the ways in which feminist politics has been practice in the past (e.g. the personal is the political). Dietz says that "we understand human beings as rational individuals who have intrinsic worth" and "The concept of rights is of fundamental importance to the liberal political vision" (Dietz 2, 4). The conclusion I draw from this is that the way feminism manifests itself in practice aligns with notions of citizenship in our political system. But this is precisely why we may perhaps need to re-conceive feminist politics in order to move away from the "mainstream view of women's work and its reliance on the law, the state, interest groups, and state-instituted reforms as the source of social justice, individual equality, and 'access'" (Dietz 8).
But Dietz does identify where this tension lies: "when power is perceived in terms of access to social, economic, or political institutions, other possibilities (including the radical one that power has nothing to do with access to institutions at all) are left out" (Dietz 7). This idea runs parallel to some of the ideas in Butler's piece, Butler's approach to feminist politics is much more epistemological. It lies in understanding and attempting to reframe our conception of gender and even our conceptions of personhood as "bounded beings, distinct, recognizable, delineated, subjects before the law, a community defined by sameness" (Butler 20). Butler acknowledges the "normative aspiration of any movement that seeks to maximize the protection and the freedoms of sexual and gender minorities" can be difficult to reconcile with the paradox of "bodily autonomy" (Butler 21). Butler starkly differs from Dietz in that she critiques the process of individuation itself, which is an entirely different and pre-existing question than a critique of the state.
Butler seems to espouse a re-conception of autonomy and societal oppression that is somewhat Foucauldian. She says that "perhaps the interrelated movements and modes of inquiry that collect here might need to consider autonomy as one dimension of their normative aspirations...the way in which the body figures in gender and sexuality studies, and in the struggles for a less oppressive social world for otherwise gendered and for sexual minorities of all kinds, is precisely to underscore the value of being beside oneself, of being a porous boundary,,,in a field of others in which one is not the presumptive center" (25). These words are reminiscent of a Foulcauldian conception of power, in which power is internal to everyone, and power lies not with oppressive institutions but through a network of discourse that injects power into everyone, through everything, cannot be separated from personhood and its harness-er cannot be identified as an individual or group.
I think both Dietz and Butler call for a new kind of feminist politics that departs from classical liberalism and notions of state-sponsored egalitarian pursuits. However, I think Butler's critique of our conception of our bodies is more radical and a more difficult reframing of feminist politics.
The readings do not necessarily call for a new kind of feminist politics. In particular, the ways that Dietz describes the tenets of liberalism and the "liberal political vision" are in many ways similar to the ways in which feminist politics has been practice in the past (e.g. the personal is the political). Dietz says that "we understand human beings as rational individuals who have intrinsic worth" and "The concept of rights is of fundamental importance to the liberal political vision" (Dietz 2, 4). The conclusion I draw from this is that the way feminism manifests itself in practice aligns with notions of citizenship in our political system. But this is precisely why we may perhaps need to re-conceive feminist politics in order to move away from the "mainstream view of women's work and its reliance on the law, the state, interest groups, and state-instituted reforms as the source of social justice, individual equality, and 'access'" (Dietz 8).
But Dietz does identify where this tension lies: "when power is perceived in terms of access to social, economic, or political institutions, other possibilities (including the radical one that power has nothing to do with access to institutions at all) are left out" (Dietz 7). This idea runs parallel to some of the ideas in Butler's piece, Butler's approach to feminist politics is much more epistemological. It lies in understanding and attempting to reframe our conception of gender and even our conceptions of personhood as "bounded beings, distinct, recognizable, delineated, subjects before the law, a community defined by sameness" (Butler 20). Butler acknowledges the "normative aspiration of any movement that seeks to maximize the protection and the freedoms of sexual and gender minorities" can be difficult to reconcile with the paradox of "bodily autonomy" (Butler 21). Butler starkly differs from Dietz in that she critiques the process of individuation itself, which is an entirely different and pre-existing question than a critique of the state.
Butler seems to espouse a re-conception of autonomy and societal oppression that is somewhat Foucauldian. She says that "perhaps the interrelated movements and modes of inquiry that collect here might need to consider autonomy as one dimension of their normative aspirations...the way in which the body figures in gender and sexuality studies, and in the struggles for a less oppressive social world for otherwise gendered and for sexual minorities of all kinds, is precisely to underscore the value of being beside oneself, of being a porous boundary,,,in a field of others in which one is not the presumptive center" (25). These words are reminiscent of a Foulcauldian conception of power, in which power is internal to everyone, and power lies not with oppressive institutions but through a network of discourse that injects power into everyone, through everything, cannot be separated from personhood and its harness-er cannot be identified as an individual or group.
I think both Dietz and Butler call for a new kind of feminist politics that departs from classical liberalism and notions of state-sponsored egalitarian pursuits. However, I think Butler's critique of our conception of our bodies is more radical and a more difficult reframing of feminist politics.
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