Kristeva’s
piece “New Forms of Revolt” applies psychoanalysis to patterns of revolt. In
it’s most basic form, Kristeva believes that there are two types of revolt. The
first type of revolt is political in nature and responding to the issue of
being a subject. The second form of revolt is ground in dealing with the issues
of questioning, knowledge and belief.
In the old form of political revolt was
a response to unfair subjugation, the people organized with one another to
change the political system. This was based on external oppression and socially
constructed barriers. Specifically, Kristeva defines the old kind of revolt as
challenging pre-established norms, values and powers in a political manner.
However, Kristeva realizes that in her own country, being a subject is no
longer an issue. Thus she poses the question, how does one revolt if you are
not a subject? I argue that in a political system, the system accounts only for
those who are the subject. If one is not a subject the political system has no
effect on ones ability to revolt.
Kristeva
also brings up a form of revolt that questions one's own being. According to
the reading, popular religion and philosophy advocated for this type of
questioning. The self was questioned and explored. This
internal revolution is an active self-analysis wherein the subject recognizes that
their being is in constant motion. By allowing for self-introspection one is
revolting against convention and the categories placed on the many.
I'm interested in what you mean by "If one is not a subject the political system has no effect on ones ability to revolt." Who does Kristeva consider to be the subjects of a political system, and who are excluded from this estimation? Also, I'm curious as to what extent one's exclusion from subject-hood affects one's ability to revolt. If Kristeva espouses the notion that a new (more effective) form of revolt requires an interrogation of the notion of "being," then I feel as though this problematizes the notion of the "subject." I would argue that Kristeva questions the notion that there is even a static or stable definition of a subject in a political system. Or, more specifically, the most meaningful definition of subjecthood is one that incorporates the techniques of inner revolt.
ReplyDeleteFinally, I wonder what Kristeva would say about the relationship between subjecthood in the context of being and citizenship in the context of democracy. Do citizens who buy into a democratic system also engage in inner revolt despite giving in to the system? Also, in a democracy, what qualifies as an internal revolt and a questioning of the political system?